Urban transportation is being transformed by mobility-on-demand (MoD) systems. One of the goals of MoD systems is to provide personalized transportation services to passengers. This process is facilitated by a centralized operator that coordinates the assignment of vehicles to individual passengers, based on location data. However, current approaches assume that accurate positioning information for passengers and vehicles is readily available. This assumption raises privacy concerns. In this work, we address this issue by proposing a method that protects passengers' drop-off locations (i.e., their travel destinations). Formally, we solve a batch assignment problem that routes vehicles at obfuscated origin locations to passenger locations (since origin locations correspond to previous drop-off locations), such that the mean waiting time is minimized. Our main contributions are two-fold. First, we formalize the notion of privacy for continuous vehicle-topassenger assignment in MoD systems, and integrate a privacy mechanism that provides formal guarantees. Second, we present a polynomial-time iterative version of the Hungarian algorithm to allocate a redundant number of vehicles to a single passenger. This algorithm builds on the insight that even during peak rush hour there are unoccupied (redundant) traveling vehicles. This strategy allows us to reduce the performance deterioration induced by the privacy mechanism. In particular, it enables the exploration of the trade-off between privacy levels, waiting time, and deployed fleet size. We evaluate our methods on a real, large-scale data set consisting of over 11 million taxi rides (specifying vehicle availability and passenger requests), recorded over a month's duration, in the area of Manhattan, New York. Based on current traffic statistics, our evaluations indicate that privacy can be achieved without incurring a significant loss of performance, and that this loss can be further controlled by varying operator or user preferences.
I. INTRODUCTION
The availability of location-based services is transforming a wide variety of applications. This development is being fueled by the increasing use of personal mobile communication devices (smart phones) that are endowed with positioning sensors, such as GPS. Importantly, the availability of precise positioning information in dense urban settings, and the joint decrease in communication costs, has paved the way for mobility-on-demand systems (MoD), such as Lyft 1 and Uber 2 . The potential of improved urban mobility systems has been largely acknowledged due to the possibility of reducing congestion, vehicle service cost and emissions [12] . Importantly, such services also respond to the needs of individuals, for example by reducing travel cost (through vehicle- Fig. 1 .
Topological representation of Manhattan as computed by our framework described in Sec. III. The edges of the graph are colored to represent the expected traversal speed. We zoom into the area around the Flatiron building, located at 40°44' 27.8196" N 73°59' 22.9164" W.
sharing) and reducing waiting times (through centralized vehicle coordination) [2] .
However, the use of location-based services to facilitate MoD systems poses a privacy threat to the individual participants. Indeed, vehicles reporting the exact coordinates of a user's drop-off location (travel destination) may reveal sensitive information about the user's habits, and hence, may deter users from using such systems. Consequently, we ask ourselves what were to happen if vehicle locations were not reported precisely, but rather imprecisely. Indeed, by perturbing the vehicle locations, it is expected that the user will enjoy greater privacy -at the cost of a loss of service quality. Hence, our goal is to propose a solution that protects user travel destinations, thus ensuring privacy, while simultaneously minimizing the loss of MoD service quality.
In this work, we consider a fleet of vehicles and passengers demanding to be picked up at specific locations. We pose this problem as a batch assignment of vehicles to passengers, similar to the approach taken in [2] . This assignment is facilitated by a centralized operator that collects all customer requests, i.e. the locations at which a vehicle is requested. Once a passenger is assigned a vehicle, she communicates her travel destination to her vehicle (by-passing the central operator). Upon completion of the passenger transport, the vehicle immediately communicates its availability to the central operator and specifies its current location. Since doing so would compromise the passenger's travel destination (i.e., the current vehicle position is equal to the dropped-off passenger's destination), we develop an assignment strategy that deals with obfuscated vehicle origin locations. We also indicate how our current framework can be extended to include passenger origin obfuscation.
Although the origin of privacy research stems from the domains of database theory and statistics [1, 6] , it has matured to the point of gaining significant traction in many crossdisciplinary domains, including the Internet of Things [15] and robotics [11] . However, it has not yet been applied to the MoD problem. Indeed, most literature in the domain of MoD systems focuses on the questions of load re-balancing and predictive positioning [9, 10, 14] , and vehicle assignment with passenger pooling [2] .
The contributions of our work are summarized as follows. First, we formalize the notion of privacy for continuous vehicle-to-passenger assignment in MoD systems. Building on prior work in location privacy, we combine the notion of geo-indistinguishability with the batch vehicle assignment problem to guarantee private vehicle origin locations. Second, we present a polynomial-time algorithm that can take advantage of unoccupied vehicles to reduce the performance deterioration induced by the privacy mechanism. In particular, this algorithm allows the operator or users to explore the trade-space between privacy and performance (as measured by vehicle travel, vehicle fleet size, and passenger waiting times). Lastly, we evaluate our methods on a real, large-scale data set consisting of over 11 million taxi rides (specifying vehicle availability and passenger requests), recorded in the area of Manhattan, New York.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a batch that consists of M passengers, each requesting one vehicle, and N available vehicles. We model the transport network via a weighted directed graph, G = (V, E, W). Vertices in the set V represent geographic locations, where a node i has a position x i ∈ R 2 . Nodes i and j are connected by an edge if (i, j) ∈ E. A weight w ij ∈ W quantifies the cost of traversing this edge -we assume this cost to be equal to the time needed to reach node j from node i. We assume the graph G is a strongly connected graph, i.e., a path exists between any pair of vertices. At the beginning of each assignment epoch, vehicles are located at nodes v ∈ V N , and passengers are located at nodes p ∈ V M . Hence, the positions of a vehicle i and a passenger j are given by x vi and x pj , respectively. The vehicle-to-passenger assignment is denoted by a binary matrix A ∈ {0, 1} N ×M , which is constrained by In other words, we assign D = 1 vehicles to each passenger, and call this our nonredundant scheme 3 . We capture the cost for vehicle i to travel to a passenger j by a matrix C ∈ R N ×M with elements c ij . Finally, we measure the performance of our assignment 3 For a redundant assignment with D > 1 (and where N > M ), we have N i a ij ≤ 1 and M j a ij ≥ 1 and M ≤ N i M j a ij ≤ N . The performance is then measured as the mean waiting time until pick-up by the fastest vehicle. strategy by considering the waiting times until pick-up, given by c ij where a ij = 1 for all passengers j ∈ 1, . . . , M .
Once a vehicle has picked-up and transported a passenger to her desired location, the vehicle notifies the central operator that it is available by communicating its obfuscated position. This position corresponds to the vehicle's origin for the subsequent assignment epoch, with the true (nonobfuscated) value equal to the previous passenger's travel destination. Our problem can now be stated as follows.
Problem 1. Design a method that routes vehicles to passengers, while minimizing average passenger waiting times, and while guaranteeing a desired level of privacy for passenger travel destinations.
III. MANHATTAN TAXICAB DATASET
We focus the evaluations of our work on the geographical area of Manhattan, and rely on a public dataset of New York City yellow taxicab operation to provide us with real passenger demand and vehicle availability information. 4 The dataset was collected during the month of June, 2016, and consists of 11 million taxi rides. The data specifies the time and location of pick-up and drop-off, as well as trip distance and fare. In order to facilitate the evaluation of our methods, we create a graph of Manhattan by accessing actual street networks from OpenStreetMap 5 [4] . Our topological representation of Manhattan consists of 4302 nodes and 9414 edges. In order to deploy algorithms based on this representation, we first define the cost of traversing any edge in this graph. In the context of transportation, an intuitive cost function is given by the expected travel time. Hence, we use the pick-up and drop-off locations listed in the June, 2016, dataset to compute all trajectories taken, assuming that the shortest path (length-wise) was chosen. We associate each trajectory with the listed travel time. Each edge of the trajectory is assigned a travel time proportional to its length. After processing all trajectories, we can compute the mean travel time w ij of each edge (i, j) in the graph. Figure 1 shows the resulting expected travel times for all edges in the graph of Manhattan.
In order to solve the assignment problem, in the remainder of this work, we assemble passenger requests and vehicle availabilities into batches that consider 20 second timewindows. Figure 2 shows data collected on Friday June 1st, 2016. We process the ride data to show the number of new passenger requests per batch. The data shows how demand peaks during the morning and late afternoon rush hours, with fluctuations at lunch time.
IV. BACKGROUND
In the following, we review the notions of location privacy upon which we build our methodology. Several approaches to location privacy have been proposed thus far -a comprehensive review is offered in [3, 8] . Most of these methods, however, assume that the adversary's prior belief . From all rides recorded in that 24 h time-interval, we only select rides that start and end on the island of Manhattan. We show the number of passenger pick-ups made per 20 s intervals (green curve). We also show the total number of occupied taxis at any given moment (blue curve). The data is smoothed over 30 min rolling windows, and the shaded areas show the corresponding standard deviations.
(side information) is known, and are explicitly modeled on this assumption [13] . Such approaches have the downside that any inconsistency or change in the attacker's side information leads to an immediate threat (and privacy is no longer guaranteed). Indeed, a much stronger definition of privacy is one that is independent of any current or future attacker model. Consequently, there has been much interest in differentially private formalisms that abstract from adversary's side information [6] .
A. Differential Privacy
Stemming from the domain of statistical databases, the goal of differential privacy is to protect individual entries in a given database (in our case, passenger drop-off locations), while simultaneously allowing aggregate information about the database to be released through a query (in our case, a query that outputs the vehicles' origin locations). The key requirement is that changing an individual's entry in the database (i.e., a vehicle origin location that corresponds to a specific passenger drop-off location) should not have a significant affect on the outcome of the query. More formally, if the probability that a query returns a value from a database lies within an e ǫ multiplicative bound of the probability that the same query returns the same value from an adjacent 6 database, then the query is said to produce ǫ-indistinguishable outcomes [7] . Notably, this definition is void of any threat model, and hence, is independent of any side information that the attacker might own. In order to preserve ǫ-indistinguishability, privacy mechanisms consist of adding random noise (commonly drawn from a Laplace distribution) to the query output.
B. Geo-Indistinguishability
The location privacy formalism put forward by Andres et al. [3] , termed geo-indistinguishability, is a generalization of differential privacy to the metric domain. In the following, we introduce the main concepts with an adapted notation. Geoindistinguishability considers a query that exposes a position 6 Two databases are adjacent if they differ by one entry.
x from a database. The privacy leakage can be formulated as
where x is a true position stored in the original database, x ′ is the corresponding altered position stored in an adjacent database, andx is an obfuscated position. The idea of geoindistinguishability is to ensure that two positions x and x ′ are indistinguishable when they are close to each other. In other words, a user enjoys ǫr-privacy within a radius r, if any two locations that are at most r apart produce query results with similar distributions.
Definition 1 (Adapted from Def. 3.1 [3] : Geo-indistinguishability). A mechanism that returnsx, for a given x or a given x ′ , satisfies ǫ-geo-indistinguishability iff for all x and x ′ :
Building on prior results [5] , the authors argue that the obfuscated positionx is to be drawn from a two-dimensional Laplace distribution inversely scaled by ǫ, and centered at x. Formally, we have thatx ∼ L(x, ǫ), and we define the corresponding probability density function as P L (x|x, ǫ). In order to satisfy ǫ-geo-indistinguishability, we implement this proposed privacy mechanism. 7 Fig. 3 demonstrates the effect of this mechanism, applied to the coordinates of the Flatiron building in Manhattan. We observe how, as the scale of the Laplacian increases (i.e., ǫ decreases), the noise (and hence privacy) increases. In the context of vehicle routing, it becomes clear that increased privacy comes at the cost of performance deterioration due to an obfuscation of vehicle positions that leads to suboptimal vehicle routing. In the following sections, we discuss this effect and propose a method that enables a minimization of this loss of performance.
V. BATCH VEHICLE ROUTING UNDER PRIVACY
The goal is to assign and route vehicles to passengers such that each passenger is picked up, while minimizing the total assignment cost. We formalize this vehicle routing problem as finding the optimal assignment solution A ⋆ :
with constraints
The element a ⋆ ij of matrix A ⋆ specifies whether the final solution routes vehicle i to passenger j.
The system above is a linear sum assignment problem, also known as the problem of minimum weight matching in bipartite graphs. We use the Hungarian algorithm (or Kuhn-Munkres algorithm), to solve the system and find an optimal assignment A ⋆ . This assignment is deterministic, and vehicles follow the shortest path (or one of the shortest paths, if several exist) to reach their assigned passenger.
To compute the elements c ij of the cost matrix C, we consider the cost incurred when routing a vehicle located at a node i to a passenger located at a node j. The cost of this path is given by the sum of the weights of edges that lie on it
where S ij is the set of edges in the shortest path between node i and node j, and w kl ∈ W is the weight of an edge (k, l), and corresponds to vehicle travel time, as described in Sec. III. 8 We can now compute the cost for all possible vehicle-to-passenger assignments
and subsequently solve system (3).
A. Solving the Assignment Problem under Obfuscation
Our goal is to increase the privacy of vehicle origin locations (we remind the reader that the vehicle origin and the previous passenger drop-off locations are the same). We do this by implementing the privacy mechanism described in Sec. IV-B to produce obfuscated (noisy) vehicle origin locations, denoted by xṽ i for all vehicles i = 1, . . . , Ni.e., xṽ i ∼ L(x vi , ǫ). We compute the expected costc ij of routing a vehicle from a probable node v i to a true passenger location p j , given that the vehicle is located around a noisy position xṽ i generated by a planar Laplace distribution with inverse scale parameter ǫ:
where η is a normalization constant. We adapt the original objective in (3) to account for the expected cost:
aij. (7) We note that, since the cost valuesc ij are noisy, this assignment produces a suboptimal assignmentÃ ⋆ with respect to the true vehicle origin locations. We measure the performance of this assignment by considering the passenger 8 For simplicity, this work considers time-invariant weights.
waiting times c ij withã ⋆ ij = 1, where c ij corresponds to the effective waiting time (based on the true, non-obfuscated vehicle origins). Proof. Given a query that reports the current set of vehicle positions, the leakage formula can be written as:
i represents an alternative position for vehicle i. The numerator refers to the database containing all true positions, while the denominator refers to an adjacent database where the position of a single vehicle has been changed. By the definition of ǫ-geo-indistinguishability (cf. Section IV-B) and since all obfuscated positions are independent, we obtain:
B. Redundant Vehicle Assignment
Vehicle-to-passenger assignments that are based on obfuscated positions will result in degraded performance. Some of this performance loss can be recovered by realizing that, in practice, a large proportion of the deployed vehicle fleet is unoccupied. In fact, according to the 2014 NYC Taxicab Factbook, during the 4pm-6pm rush hours only 64% of cabs are occupied, while the rest of the fleet is traveling empty. 9 Consequently, our idea is to assign these unoccupied (redundant) vehicles to passengers. Among assigned vehicles, only the fastest vehicle will actually pick up the passenger. This algorithm allows us to exploit the slack that is already present in taxicab systems to re-route unoccupied traveling vehicles, without deploying new vehicles, to reduce the 
ij a ij 10: end for expected passenger waiting time (with respect to the nonredundant assignment strategy). 10 Clearly, this strategy needs be carefully implemented to account for other factors (e.g., load re-balancing) -this, however, is outside the scope of this paper. Algorithm 1 proposes a polynomial-time procedure that assigns D vehicles to each passenger. When D > 1, we refer to the assignment as redundant. The key component of this algorithm is that it computes the optimal assignment of (several) vehicles to each passenger based on a cost matrix that is built incrementally with each additionally assigned vehicle. Lines 1 and 2 compute the solution to the basic non-redundant assignment, as seen in the previous section. At each iteration (starting on line 3), the procedure adds an additional vehicle to each passenger such that the sum of expected waiting time is minimized. On line 7, the set Z j contains the indeces of the currently assigned vehicles for passenger j. Line 8 computes the expected waiting time resulting from assigning an additional vehicle i to a passenger j. The computation makes use of the waiting time for servicing a passenger j with a set of vehicles located at nodes k, w(k, p j ) = min k∈k f (k, p j ).
The computation in line 8 also makes use of the probability that a set of vehicles Z is effectively located at nodes k, given that a vehicle i reports a noisy position xṽ i ,
where zip(A, B) corresponds to the list of pairs obtained by combining elements of A and B in the same order (with |A| = |B|). 11 Line 9 combines the previous assignment with the newly optimized one. It is worth noting that line 8 10 The underlying reasoning is that for two random variables X and Y representing passenger pick-up times, we have that E[min(X, Y )] ≤ min(E[X], E[Y ]). can be computed quickly (i) by memorizing the results of the previous iteration for the next, (ii) by ignoring nodes that have a minor impact on the computation ofc ij (e.g., nodes k such that P L (xṽ i |k, ǫ) ≤ p min for some arbitrary threshold p min , and (iii) by pre-computing for each node in the graph, this list of relevant nodes (nearest nodes given the latter threshold), and their shortest route lengths to every other node in the graph. Hence, the overall complexity is bounded by the Hungarian algorithm, and is in the order of 
C. Performance
The following results are based on the dataset and graph described in Section III, and show the performance of the batch assignment strategy for varying levels of noise. Fig. 4 shows passenger waiting times for 500 vehicles and 250 passengers, obtained after non-redundant single-vehicle assignments. Passenger and vehicle locations are sampled according to the actual distribution of pick-up and drop-off locations, respectively, as recorded over the month of June 2016. Using an optimal (noise-free) assignment algorithm, the mean waiting time is just under 1 minute. We observe that as the noise level increases, the distribution shifts, resulting in higher mean waiting times. Fig. 5 shows the performance of the batch assignment algorithm, as a function of the Laplace inverse scale parameter ǫ, for 250 passengers and 1000 vehicles. We consider non-redundant as well as redundant assignments. The left side panel shows the average waiting time, and the right side shows the degradation in performance of the private (suboptimal) assignment with respect to the non-private (optimal) assignment (also shown by a dashed line on the left panel). As we increase the redundancy level, we reduce the loss of performance, as measured by the mean waiting time. 
VI. CONTINUOUS VEHICLE ROUTING UNDER PRIVACY
In practice, after a vehicle has dropped off its passenger, it becomes available again for another assignment batch. We refer to consecutive assignments of the same vehicle to consecutive passengers as continuous vehicle routing. In contrast to batch vehicle routing, continuous vehicle routing poses the additional challenge of ensuring that the obfuscated drop-off locations are reported at times that correspond to the travel distances between reported (obfuscated) locations. In other words, a vehicle effectively reports its availability at a moment in time that is either before or after it truly drops off its passenger, since reporting its availability at the true moment would compromise the privacy of the drop-off location. In the following, we demonstrate that the continuous vehicle assignment strategy respects promised privacy guarantees. We elaborate the strategy for non-redundant as well as redundant assignments.
A. Continuous Non-Redundant Vehicle Assignment
The procedure according to which a vehicle is routed to a passenger in the private continuous assignment scheme is as follows. At the start, the vehicle communicates with the operator to report its obfuscated position, and to receive its next passenger assignment. Once this assignment is known, the vehicle directly communicates with the passenger (bypassing the central operator) to obtain the true passenger destination. Based on this information, the vehicle computes an obfuscated drop-off location (by adding planar Laplace noise) and the moment in time when this fictitious location will be reached (i.e., when the vehicle availability must be reported). Figure 6 (a) illustrates this procedure on a twodimensional workspace, showing the offset produced by the privacy mechanism, and its effect on the travel time. Since the vehicle availability, as reported to the operator, might happen before the actual vehicle availability, it is important that vehicles do not keep an ever increasing backlog of passenger requests. However, since obfuscated drop-off positions are sampled from unbiased probability distributions, there is no bias towards reporting availability sooner rather than later, and the backlog effect does not happen in practice.
For clarity, the following formulations use the symbols defined in the Fig. 6 , where • and • represent real and obfuscated origin locations, and where and ▽ represent real and obfuscated drop-off locations, respectively. Proof. The proof follows a similar structure to the one of Proposition 1. Since the query only returns the last obfuscated position of all vehicles (and a passenger takes a single ride), we have:
where i refers to the latest drop-off location of vehicle i, and ′ i refers to an alternative drop-off location. The duration t (known to the operator) refers to the reported duration of the latest ride of vehicle i. As shown in Figure 6 (a), this duration is fully determined by the previously and currently reported drop-off locations. Hence, if we assume independence of pick-up and drop-off locations, we obtain:
Remark 1. This proof assumes the independence of pickup and drop-off locations. In reality, it is often possible to correlate the pick-up and drop-off locations given the time of day. As a result, it may be necessary to vary the level of obfuscation throughout the day by tuning ǫ as a function of the pick-up location.
Remark 2. Passengers who take n subsequent rides only benefit from an nǫ-geo-indistinguishable drop-off (since obfuscated positions are independent from each other). In practice, this leakage can be reduced by correlating subsequent obfuscated positions that relate to a given same passenger.
B. Continuous Redundant Vehicle Assignment
Much like the redundant batch assignment strategy, continuous assignment can also be implemented with a redundant number of vehicles per passenger. This procedure is schematized in Figure 6 (b). In contrast to Figure 6 (a), Figure 6 (b) shows two vehicles that are assigned to pick up a passenger. The vehicles will mutually agree upon which one will truly pick up the passenger (i.e., the one that is truly closer). The selected vehicle computes an obfuscated drop-off location, and communicates this value to the redundant vehicle, which uses it to compute its itinerary (to a fake drop-off location). At the end of the respective travel times, both vehicles report their availability as well as the same obfuscated drop-off location (this operation is not synchronized). Proof. We illustrate the proof for a two-vehicle assignment where the vehicle i picks up the passenger and drops her off at position i (refer to Figure 6(b) ). Similarly to the previous proof, we obtain:
= sup ln P( ti|•i, ▽i,j)P( tj|•j, ▽i,j)P(•i|•i)P(•j|•j)P(▽i,j| i )
The same holds if vehicle j picks the passenger up. 
C. Implementation
Our implementation details are as follows: (a) We use the real recorded passenger pick-up times to represent the times when vehicles are requested. Requests are batched into 20 s intervals. If requests are not serviced in the current batch, they roll over to the next one, and those that are not serviced within 10 min are dropped (all schemes exhibit a drop rate below 0.15%). (b) The total fleet size is the same for all algorithms, and follows the number of occupied vehicles reported in Figure 2 . In specific, for a given time of day, we take the number of occupied vehicles reported in the NYC dataset and multiply this value by 1.56 (to account for the unreported unoccupied vehicles). This factor of 1.56 corresponds to rush hour statistics (4pm-6pm) and is a worst case scenario for the ratio of fleet size to occupied vehicles. 12 (c) The computation runs in real-time: an Intel Xeon CPU running at 3.5 GHz can process and assign one batch of passengers in 145 ms on average, and with the 99th percentile at 389 ms.
D. Performance
The following results are based on the dataset and graph described in Section III. We show the performance of the continuous assignment strategy (for a constant privacy level, given by ǫ = 0.02) applied to the data recorded during the 24 hours of Friday 1st of June, 2016.
Given that passenger demand varies throughout the day, we vary the number of redundant assignments D to account for the bounded number of vehicles that are deployed. For each batch, we choose D such there is at least 1 vehicle per passenger, and such that a sufficient number of vehicles is left unassigned: we only assign redundant vehicles if the number of remaining unassigned vehicles is at least as large as 50% of the current number of requests. Redundant assignments D made by our algorithm, and mean passenger waiting time, as a function of the time of day. The data is smoothed over 10 min. rolling windows, and the shaded areas show the corresponding standard deviations. Figure 8 shows the results in the form of violin plots that represent the distribution of the passenger waiting times until pick-up. We show the performance of the continuous non-redundant and redundant assignment schemes, and, to benchmark our results, we also show the performance of the optimal (non-private) assignment algorithm. The private non-redundant scheme is 28% worse than the optimal assignment scheme with an average waiting time increase of 48 s; the redundant scheme improves over the non-redundant scheme and is only 1% worse that the optimal assignment scheme, with an average waiting time increase of 2 s. Finally, comparing the 99th percentiles, we note that the redundant scheme provides a 34% improvement over the non-redundant scheme by mitigating large waiting times.
VII. CONCLUSION
This work is situated in the context of centrally operated MoD systems, and considers the problem of assigning vehicles to passengers such that the mean waiting time is minimized. In specific, we provide a method that solves the assignment problem under obfuscated vehicle origin positions, such that the destinations of previously droppedoff passengers remains private. Our main contributions are two-fold. First, we formalized the notion of privacy for continuous vehicle-to-passenger assignment by building on the concept of geo-indistinguishability. Second, to minimize performance loss, we presented an algorithm that takes advantage of unoccupied vehicles in the system, combining multiple iterations of the Hungarian algorithm to allocate a redundant number of vehicles to a single passenger. We evaluated our method on a dataset consisting of over 11 million taxi rides. The results demonstrate the feasibility of our approach -based on real traffic data, we show that privacy can be achieved, even during highly constrained periods (e.g. rush hours), without deploying additional vehicles into the fleet. More importantly, our framework can be used to explore the trade-space between privacy, waiting time, and the cost of re-routing unoccupied vehicles.
Future work will consider the tuning of individualized privacy levels as a function of user behavior (as addressed in Remarks 1 and 2), or as a function of heterogeneous user preferences (e.g., reduction of waiting time at the cost of a loss of privacy). Further studies will be done to quantify the operational costs of re-routing unoccupied vehicles (to redundant assignments), to identify trade-offs that produce economically attractive solutions.
